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Introduction  
Mortgage loans have become a central driver of credit growth in the majority of industrially 
mature economies today, making up roughly 60 per cent of bank’s total lending portfolios, 
compared to 30 per cent over a century ago (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor 2016). Yet, while 
there is broad consensus that housing finance has come to play a central role in the modern 
macroeconomy (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008, Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor 2016), 
empirical and conceptual understanding vis-à-vis cross-national differences in the 
institutional structure and form of housing finance provision, both contemporarily and 
historically, remains almost as unchecked as when Mark Boléat (1985: 483) lamented the 
‘marked lack of knowledge about housing finance systems’ over three decades ago.  
 
Housing scholars (Aalbers and Christophers 2014, Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008) have 
begun to examine housing finance with more rigour since the Global Financial Crisis, but 
much of this research lacks historical scope and focuses mainly on developments since the 
1990s. Financial historians, on the other hand, have focused almost exclusively on banking 
and corporate finance systems (Fohlin 2012, Verdier 2002b) - and the varying institutional 
dynamics of market-based versus bank-based finance systems - and economists (Jordà, 
Schularick, and Taylor 2016, Bezemer and Samarina 2016), as well as political economists 
(Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008), have tended, with rare exception (Fuller 2015), to privilege 
the analysis of aggregate mortgage volumes, ignoring important institutional differences 
between housing finance systems and the historically diverse origins of housing finance 
system heterogeneity.  
 
This comparative-historical study aims to address these lacunae by examining the 
complexion of national housing finance systems in a variety of OECD countries with a view 
to understanding their emergence, diffusion, and endurance through time. The paper’s aims 
are threefold. First, we propose a historically informed typology of housing finance systems. 
Identifying proto-industrial housing finance institutions as important historical precursors for 
the institutional templates of urban mortgage finance that developed during the long 
nineteenth century throughout the OECD, we observe four distinct modes of housing finance 
provision, whose legacies are broadly recognisable today. These are, in order of the degree of 
credit centralisation (least to most): the direct finance mode; the deposit-based finance mode; 
the bond-based finance mode; and the state finance mode1. These modes represent more a 
continuum in which movement between modes over time is infrequent, rather than absolute 
categories, but there is also a spatial-temporal dimension to our schema.  
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All countries surveyed here, at one stage, relied on direct finance organised through families 
or notary networks, making this a historical point of departure for essentially all housing 
finance systems. Many also relied on forms of state assistance when establishing their 
institutionalised housing finance systems during the nineteenth century, or subsequently in 
response to capital scarcity brought about by wars or other severe socio-economic 
dislocations. Notwithstanding the patterns of informal intermediation, or the varying degrees 
of state support, however, we observe that the majority of OECD countries essentially 
developed along two trajectories of urban housing finance during the course of the long 
nineteenth century: one based on the collection of deposits, and the other based on the sale of 
bonds on capital markets. We find that Anglo-Saxon and North-Western European countries 
developed a predominantly deposit-based system of housing finance, whereas central 
continental European and Scandinavian countries developed bond-based systems in order to 
finance their urban expansions, with varying degrees of state sponsorship. While the Southern 
and Eastern European countries upheld the direct finance mode much longer than their 
central and northern counterparts, these countries generally developed deposit based systems 
as the twentieth century progressed. 
 
Second, we build upon Gerschenkron-inspired explanatory hypotheses emanating from 
corporate finance literature (Verdier 2002a) in order to account for this observed housing 
finance system heterogeneity. Cross-national differences in institutional forms of housing 
finance provision that emerged in many OECD countries during the long nineteenth century 
were ultimately the products of attempts by a range of state and non-state actors to mobilise 
long term capital during periods of demographic transition, or in response to exogenous city- 
or region-level shocks, but not all countries adopted the same methods or means of capital 
mobilisation. Indeed, we note that late industrialisers tended to develop bond-based or even 
state finance systems during the nineteenth century establishment phase, while earlier 
industrialisers, and those closely connected to the English-speaking world, relied more on 
deposits.  
 
In all cases surveyed here, the need to resolve impediments to capital mobilisation, in the 
face of demographic change and growing demand for mortgage credit, created the fulcrum 
around which class and sectoral conflicts were played out; and legal factors and relative 
levels of democratisation played important conditioning roles here too. Once an 
institutionalised housing finance system mode was established prior to 1914, we document a 
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path-dependent development which endured for nearly a century when, during the 1970s, the 
territorially bound nature of these institutions’ assets and liabilities became (somewhat) 
decoupled from the geographical regions they were originally established to serve with the 
advent of financial globalisation. 
 
Third, we assess the significance of our typologies in light of corporate finance literature and 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approaches to the study of financial system development. We 
observe that, prima facie, the variegated forms of housing finance that emerged throughout 
this period calibrate with the Gerschenkron-inspired corporate finance typologies (Zysman 
1983, Verdier 2002b), and the varieties of residential capitalism typologies advanced by 
Schwartz & Seabrooke (2008). Countries characterised as market-based or liberal in these 
traditions tended to develop specialised deposit-based institutions in order to finance their 
urban expansions, whereas countries characterised as bank-based, or corporatist in Schwartz 
& Seabrook’s groups, were more likely to develop specialised bond-based mortgage banks.  
 
Despite this ostensive degree of correspondence between the spheres of housing and 
corporate finance, however, we observe that the logics underpinning the Gerschenkron-
inspired distinction between so-called market-based and bank-based systems within 
corporate finance literature - adapted ideal-typically in the VoC approach - are somewhat 
turned on their heads when applied to national housing finance systems. So-called liberal 
market economies (LMEs), whose corporate finance systems have historically been 
characterised as market-based, developed deposit-based mortgage institutions, whereas the 
bank-based coordinated market economies (CMEs) are historically associated with mortgage 
systems based on the sale of bonds on capital markets. Market-based countries thus 
developed housing finance systems which were ostensibly off market, whereas the bank-
based countries developed bond-based systems which were very much market-based.  
 
This disjuncture, we suggest, relates to fundamental differences in the way capital was 
mobilised for the purpose of urban expansion between countries and regions during the 
nineteenth century and, significantly, by whom. We note that while the forces behind 
institutional differentiation in countries’ housing and corporate finance systems appear to 
have been similar, the mechanisms and subsequent path-dependencies have created different, 
isolated circuits of capital, which have relevance to the present day. Indeed, we find 
associations between our historically bond-based countries and certain features of 
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contemporary mortgage systems, such as less reliance on mortgage securitization, less 
mortgage market liberalisation and a stronger tendency towards to what Gregory W. Fuller 
terms credit mitigation (Fuller 2015). 
 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section analyses corporate finance literature and 
VoC contributions from the fields of financial history and political economy and seeks to 
apply a modified version of Gerschenkron’s theory of economic backwardness to national 
housing finance systems. Following this, we survey the characteristics of the aforementioned 
housing finance system modes and seek to explain their emergence. We then empirically 
explain the emergence and path-dependency of these the systems using bivariate and 
multivariate panel analyses. Finally, the discussion section and conclusion point to the 
consequences of our four modes for existing typologies and contemporary financial systems. 
Financial Systems and Late Development 
Various explanations have been advanced to account for the cross-national differences in 
financial system structure, but these have invariably been concerned with the development of 
corporate and not housing finance (Verdier 2002b, Fohlin 2000). Although a degree of 
overlap exists between these two spheres, institutionalised housing finance has historically 
been organised independently via specialised institutions. Nonetheless, we draw on corporate 
finance approaches - which encompass economic, political, and legal explanations - in order 
to make sense of the different developmental paths in national housing finance systems.  
 
A first such approach draws inspiration from Alexander Gerschenkron. Gerschenkron’s core 
insight was the notion that stages of economic development help to predict the type of 
financial system that would subsequently develop in the pre-WWI industrial nations (Fohlin 
2016, 419). This thesis provides a purely economic assessment: the earlier a country 
industrialised, the more capital markets, and not banks, determined the structure and 
composition of corporate finance (Gerschenkron 1962, Goldsmith 1969).  
 
While the clear-cut distinction into market-based and bank-based financial systems has 
recently been challenged (Fohlin 2016, Forsyth 2003), this dichotomy still features 
prominently in influential VoC approaches. Here, the distinction between market-based 
systems and bank-based corporate finance systems is one of four complementary institutional 
spheres, as schematised in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (2001). In coordinated market 
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economies (CMEs), such as Germany, universal banks had access to more insider 
information and formed close relations to companies in return for so-called patient capital. 
Conversely, in liberal market economies (LME), such as Britain, more anonymous short-term 
investors used public information in order to lend to firms on capital markets. For housing 
finance, the link between economic and financial development is less the credit needs of 
firms, but rather the capital needed to finance the rapid urbanisation that often accompanied 
the industrialisation process. We might thus intuitively expect countries’ housing finance 
systems to differ also depending on the relative stage of economic development and 
urbanisation in which said systems developed. We elaborate on this more below. 
 
A second approach focuses on the influence of political factors. In centralised states with 
fragmented deposits and a reliable lender of last resort, universal banks tended to emerge 
(Verdier 2002b). Information asymmetry disadvantaged centrally operating universal banks 
in competition with local banks under local government jurisdiction, but this was overcome 
with the support of centralising states, supported by central banks. Analogously, then, we 
might expect more centralised states to rely on the more centralised mortgage banks to 
expand and reconstruct their major towns and cities, with decentralised countries rather 
relying on the more fragmented deposits organised via specialised deposit-based institutions, 
such as building societies, which persisted for so long, in part, due to their local information 
advantages. 
 
A third approach seeks to explain financial development in relation to relative levels of 
democratisation. In late-democratising countries, such as Germany, elites organised mortgage 
and savings banks from above, hampering the inclusion of smaller creditors into the financial 
system. Conversely, in earlier democracies, such as Great Britain and the USA, more 
democratic financial institutions such as the mutual building societies in England and the 
savings and loans in the USA developed from the bottom-up (Seabrooke 2006). Extrapolating 
from these three cases we might thus expect less democratic countries to rely more on 
centralised bond-based mortgage banks established by and for financial elites2. 
 
A final approach relies on legal factors. Common Law systems tended to offer better 
protection for investors and for smaller peripheral banking structures (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer 2008). The role of legal institutions in the case of housing finance 
relates to the availability of reliable public land registries that bond-based mortgage banks 
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could rely upon in countries with a Germanic legal tradition. These registries allowed the 
centrally operating mortgage banks to penetrate the local real estate markets in which local 
actors and deposit banks had had privileged information and access hitherto. We might thus 
expect Common Law countries to display less bond-based mortgage banking activity. We 
empirically test the expectations underpinning these four approaches below. 
 
The literature on financial system development during the nineteenth century focuses much 
on the role of finance for corporate enterprises, and the importance of universal banks in 
mobilising capital on the European continent. We complement this research now by looking 
at housing finance as undertaken by the specialised housing finance institutions which 
emerged throughout much of Europe and the OECD during the long nineteenth century. Our 
exploratory investigation draws upon each of the explanatory traditions from corporate 
finance literature in order to show how financially immature countries with civil law 
traditions, lower initial levels of urbanisation and an entrenched agricultural elite were more 
likely to develop bond-based mortgage banks - with varying degrees of state-sponsorship - 
during this formative establishment phase of national housing finance systems. For now, 
though, we turn to the theoretical insights of Gerschenkron. 
 
Gerschenkron’s theory of economic backwardness 
 
Gerschenkron (1962) set about the task of trying to explain the variety of outcomes that the 
single historical process of industrialisation had generated as it spread across Europe 
(Rosenberg 2013: 202), and adapting Gerschenkron’s framework has provided fertile terrain 
for scholars interested in corporate finance, and economic development more generally 
(Verdier 2000, 2002b, Selwyn 2011). Gerschenkron did not write about housing finance 
systems and the specialised banking circuits in which they were historically couched. His 
theory does, however, have much explanatory potential and provides a lens through which to 
understand the differential outcomes brought about by the process of industrialisation vis-à-
vis national housing finance systems. Our intention here is to build upon his conceptual 
insights regarding the spatial-temporal unevenness of financial system development in pre-
WWI Europe and the OECD and to adapt these, as far as possible, in order to enhance our 
understanding of the genesis of national housing finance systems.  
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The premise of Gerschenkron’s theory revolves around examining the methods by which 
capital was mobilised during the industrialisation process. He identifies three temporally 
bound stages, beginning with the first country to undergo industrialisation: Britain. Britain’s 
accumulated private wealth and well-capitalised merchant banks were sufficient to mobilise 
resources for the purpose of investment in ‘primitive’ technology and manufacturing plants 
(Landes 1999: 275). Family fortunes, small loans, and the reinvestment of profits from initial 
investments provided the blueprint for industrial investment in Britain during her 
industrialisation (ibid.). 
 
Gerschenkron observed, however, that these processes and means were not repeated verbatim 
elsewhere, noting that subsequent industrial developments in relatively more backward 
European countries relied on different methods and means of capital mobilisation. In the less 
advanced second group, investment banks were key in mobilising capital and allocating funds 
to industry. In the case of Germany, this process involved state-sponsorship. Countries such 
as France, and particularly the USA and the Netherlands, however, arguably fall somewhere 
between Britain and Germany, in this respect. Finally, in Gerschenkron’s schema, we have 
the third area: areas of extreme backwardness (Selwyn 2011). For Gerschenkron, Russia was 
the most obvious example of this. Here, the private capital base was so weak that the state 
had to assume the central role in mobilising capital for the purpose of industrialisation. These 
temporally bound stages of industrial catch-up produced what Gerschenkron called an 
orderly system of graduated deviations from the first industrialiser (Gerschenkron 1962: 44); 
no two countries would mobilise capital during the industrialisation process in the same way.  
 
Gerschenkron’s economic backwardness thesis has the potential to offer much explanatory 
insight vis-à-vis the origin of national housing finance systems. Rapid urbanisation was a 
corollary of economic development and industrialisation in Europe during the long nineteenth 
century and this created imperatives to accommodate burgeoning urban populations, which, 
in turn, posed a capital mobilisation challenge. Producing housing requires labour and time, 
which in turn, implies upfront capital costs; often felt more acutely in the financially 
immature later developers with a weak domestic capital base. Our claim here, echoing that of 
Gerschenkron, is that these costs were borne differently in different countries, in part, based 
on their relative degree of economic and financial maturity.  
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Relating Gerschenkron’s theory to our housing finance typology, we find that the early 
industrialisers, and those English-speaking settler societies who adopted many of the 
institutions and norms of Great Britain, tended to rely on specialised deposit-based 
institutions for funding the construction of urban dwellings. Countries in Gerschenkron’s 
second mode relied on long-term financing of urban development by the establishment of 
more centrally organized specialised bond-issuing mortgage banks, with varying degrees of 
state-sponsorship. In the third mode (areas of extreme backwardness), the state tended to play 
a greater role in mobilising capital for the purpose of urban housing construction. Finally, 
those countries which failed to develop specialised housing finance institutions to any 
significant degree during the late-nineteenth century instead relied on a mixture of notary 
lending and savings and commercial banks. We embark now upon a more detailed case-by-
case analysis of our four varieties of historical housing finance system. 
Historical housing finance systems 
Modern housing finance institutions developed mostly during the nineteenth century in 
Western countries as part of the overall establishment of countries’ banking systems. The 
tradition of lending on property was by no means novel, but the displacement of personal 
credit relations by banks acting as financial intermediaries on a large scale was a new 
phenomenon. This was the era in which the traditions of informal and unmediated personal 
credit relations were steadily eroded and displaced by more formal credit transactions, 
mediated by financial institutions; and housing finance was no exception. Informal person-to-
person credit networks - within families, ethnic groups, or mediated by notaries - would still 
play an important role, but to the extent that rapid urbanisation created capital mobilisation 
challenges, eroded traditional religious and ethnic informal credit networks, and made 
investment in urban real estate a profitable undertaking, OECD countries generally developed 
organised systems of mortgage intermediation. 
 
The degree to which the institutionalisation of housing finance occurred during the nineteenth 
century, and the types of intermediation that developed, differed across countries. Nearly all 
countries developed specialised housing finance institutions whose principal function was to 
supply mortgages. These special circuits persisted for about a century, when financial 
liberalisation in the 1970 and 1980s led to the integration of many of these institutions into 
commercial banks. We now characterise and historicise our four different ideal-type 
configurations which emerged during the long nineteenth century, roughly comparable to 
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Boléat’s (1985). The fourfold distinction can be summarised along two dimensions: the 
degree to which finance is centralised, and the degree to which finance is intermediated by 
institutions. 
Table 1. Varieties of historical housing finance 
 
 
We now present these chronologically, and in accordance with their increasing degree of 
centralisation. 
Direct finance 
Direct modes of finance (those not mediated by banks or state institutions) take a variety of 
different forms. They often, but not necessarily, correlate with low levels of financial 
development and describe the type of finance found in pre-capitalist societies, or developing 
countries today (Chiquier and Lea 2009: 30). Taken to extremes, direct finance might not 
involve any credit relation, and simply imply high down payments or levels of self-build. In 
German-speaking countries high down payments remain quite regular, and in countries with a 
tradition of building wooden single-family houses, such as Canada and Finland, high rates of 
self-build still exist today. 
 
Once this subsistence mode of financing was unable to satisfy demand in urban centres 
during the proto-industrial era, external credit relations, based on kinship, neighbourhood or 
notary trust, were often entered. In such systems, capital remained mostly local in its use. 
Whilst legal frameworks were often established, lending was primarily based on informal, 
personal relations between borrower and lender, possibly involving a non-bank intermediary 
such as a solicitor. Such lending secured against real estate may not even have been publicly 
registered and even persisted in advanced mortgage environments3. 
 
In France, Germany and Belgium these networks were mostly organised by notaries who had 
privileged access to information through the legal property inscription process. In England, 
solicitors organised similar networks (Muthesius 1982: 20), and in Spain, mortgage 
cooperatives organised club-like mutual provision of mortgage credit (Vorms 2012: 186). 
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Another example of capital collection outside of formal banking circuits involved prospective 
apartment owners pooling capital, directly or via a real estate or construction firm, to build 
multi-story structures with ‘horizontal ownership’. During the capital-scarce interwar years, 
this mode became popular to overcome the breakdown of capital markets, especially in 
southern Europe4.  
 
Deposit-based finance 
In our second housing finance mode, deposit-collecting institutions are the most important. 
There are the specialised deposit-based institutions specialising in housing, such as the 
mutual building societies, and the more universal banking institutions such as savings banks, 
whose deposits are only partially used for extending mortgage credit. The same holds true for 
another type of universal deposit bank, namely credit cooperatives5. Contrary to the 
continental European savings banks, which were top-down institutions mostly founded and 
governed from above by municipalities or philanthropists, credit cooperatives were member-
based, bottom-up institutions that collected members’ deposits to provide loans, often for 
business purposes. Virtually all Anglo-Saxon countries developed building societies, which 
retained dominant market shares until the 1970s, but such institutions did not emerge on the 
European continent prior to the 1920s, and had limited market shares prior to the 1950s.  
 
The specialised deposit-based institutions specialising in housing finance (Lea 2009: 31) go 
by different names in different jurisdictions: Building Societies in Britain and Ireland; 
Savings and Loans Associations in the USA; and Loan Associations in Canada. They 
emerged most robustly in the early industrialisers and those English-speaking countries that 
adopted the institutions and norms of Britain. Until the 1970s, the central feature of these 
institutions was that they originated and funded mortgages mainly via deposits. They did not 
issue bonds like the continental Europe mortgage banks, nor did they raise funds on money or 
capital markets in order to originate mortgages like commercial banks. More often than not, 
they were mutual organisations, but despite institutional similarities, there are still important 




The world’s first known specialised deposit-based institution was formed in Birmingham in 
1775 but their numbers increased steadily henceforth throughout Britain, and later to other 
English-speaking countries. Until the 1840s, the sole purpose of these societies was to 
provide each member with a plot and a house paid for out of their collective funds and, after 
this objective had been achieved, they were dissolved (Boleat 1981: 1). However, from the 
1840s onwards, terminating societies were gradually displaced by the proliferation of 
permanent societies, which accepted deposits from savers without a contractual obligation to 
obtain a mortgage. This is when the modern Building Society was born.  
 
Initially, these institutions were geographically confined to the Midlands, Lancashire, and 
Yorkshire, but by the 1860s, there were over 750 societies in existence in London alone and 
2,000 in the provinces (BSA 2015) which played an ever-increasing role in suburban 
development (Sheppard 1971, 158). By the 1880s, they accounted for nearly 40 per cent of 
the institutional mortgage market (Samy 2008, 6), and on the eve of the outbreak of the 
Second World War, their share of the institutional mortgage market was over 60 per cent 
(ibid.). Prior to the 1930s, these institutions were small and highly localised, and their 
members were not generally high net worth individuals; but nor were they drawn 
predominantly from the working classes either (Daunton 1990a: 26).  
 
In the USA, the first specialised deposit-based institution (Buildings & Loans Association) is 
said to have been founded in Pennsylvania in 1831 (Daunton 1988: 235). They spread 
steadily from the Midwest and Eastern States, focusing initially on rural populations, but then 
increasingly on urban areas, in response to dramatic urban growth. Unlike Britain, the 
Buildings & Loans Associations were more integrated into the working-class economy 
(ibid.).  
 
In New Zealand, building societies were the main source of organised housing finance, 
starting in the 1860s and existing mostly in the form of terminating societies until the 1960s 
(Davidson 1994: 109). In Canada, the loan companies or associations were special types of 
building societies in that they also relied on debentures to some extent, often sold in London, 
as additional sources of finance (Doucet and Weaver 1991: 254). In Australia, the first 
building societies date from the 1840s and became the most important source of private 
organised housing finance as the twentieth century wore on (Hill 1959).  
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Despite differences in clientele – broadly reflecting social and class structure – and their 
respective mortgage market share, a key point to note about their institutional structure is 
that, unlike the mortgage banks which developed on the European continent, or the 
commercial and non-specialist savings banks throughout Europe and the USA during this 
period, the inflow of funds to the specialist deposit-based institutions constituted special 
circuits of capital, which, although not completely isolated from prevailing capital market 
trends, were, to some extent, hived off from competition in capital markets. These institutions 
were more likely to lend to owner-occupiers (Samy 2008, Rodger 2001, 272, Daunton 1990b, 
26), than the continental European mortgage banks and as the market share of these 
institutions grew, so too did homeownership.  
 
An interesting question to pose is why these institutions came to increase their respective 
market shares sizably in Anglo-Saxon countries during the second half of the nineteenth 
century, yet featured little in continental European settings prior to the 1950s. These 
institutions may have been more likely to lend to prospective homeowners than the bond-
based mortgage banks, but we should not think of their emergence in terms of some cultural 
predilection to home ownership that was absent on the European continent. More, it was to 
do with the decentralised and localised nature of their lending, and the overall domestic 
capital base within countries preceding their emergence. Real per capita income was higher in 
Britain and the USA than on the European continent in the first half of the nineteenth century 
(with the exception of the Low Countries: see: Maddison-Project, 2013), and this meant that, 
to the extent that existing capital resources could be tapped into, no particular need for a 
specialised bond-based mortgage bank emerged (Schulte 1918). This provides one 
explanation as to why co-called market-based countries developed housing finance systems 
that were deposit-based and not capital market based.  
 
One reason for the belated rise of specialised deposit-based institutions on the European 
continent lies in the broad network of non-specialised savings institutions already in place on 
the continent. The continental European country most characterised by a deposit-regime 
based on these non-specialised deposit banks was Belgium, which mainly relied on public 
and private savings banks and life insurances for its institutionalised housing finance (Schulte 
1918). Even though mortgage bonds existed by name, they were de jure only obligations or 
debentures issued by savings banks. The bank, not the property, backed these obligations and 
they were not traded on stock exchanges, unlike in the bond-based countries. As they were 
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not favoured by the tax system when compared with savings accounts, they did not become a 
central part of the finance system here (van Put 1966).  
Bond-based system 
The third mode of housing finance system in our schema relies on the sale of mortgage bonds 
in order to originate mortgages, imitating government and railroad securities. These compete 
on capital markets directly with other types of securities - mostly domestically, but also 
abroad depending on the degree of financial maturity within a given country - and 
proliferated in the urban centres of the later-developers during their nineteenth century urban 
expansions. These, unlike the specialised deposit-based institutions, were well integrated into 
the overall capital market. 
 
The bond-based mortgage banks spread from the East of Prussia throughout the continent. 
These institutions either existed in the form of centralised state monopolies or in the pluralist 
form of multiple private banks or mutual associations. In all cases, however, this capital 
market-based mode of housing finance was much more centralised than the deposit-based 
type6. On the demand side, insurance companies were important investors in mortgage bonds 
(Harold 2013). In general, countries’ mortgage bond circulation per capita is a good indicator 
for the realisation of this type of finance7.  
 
Mortgage banks emerged in reaction to credit dearth following wars, economic modernisation 
pressures in agriculture, or catastrophes. Though often set up to be geared towards lending for 
agricultural purposes, those banks themselves or newly established banks imitating their 
design soon redirected their business towards the growing cities and urban rental real estate 
(Martens 1988). They preferred this type of real estate because evaluation of agricultural and 
non-standardised single-family housing property was more expensive and investments in 
them were deemed riskier. Their central location, often without branch networks, meant 
lower transaction and information costs in the case of urban mortgage lending. They were 
thus closer to other banks and securities markets through which their bonds were traded than 
the specialised deposit-based institutions. Much like stock market investors in corporate 
finance, though, they suffered from information asymmetries in peripheral markets, where 
local deposit lenders had advantages. 
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Legally, mortgage banks were more likely to emerge when a public land registry ensured that 
the mortgagor or bank could be sure to rank first among the creditors in case of foreclosure. 
This is one of the legal reasons why Common Law countries but also continental European 
countries such as Belgium developed bond-based mortgage banking to a much lesser degree 
(Kreimer 1999). Their larger sources of capital allowed for larger mortgages, usually with 
higher interest-rates - in the absence of subsidisation - as mortgage bonds had to compete 
with government and other bonds on capital markets (Glasz 1935). This privileged larger 
mortgagees as clients, linking mortgage banks to the financing of a particular type of housing 
stock, i.e. mostly the building of rental flats and tenements. 
 
The origins of modern mortgage banks reach back to the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War. 
Frederick the Great obliged local landholders to enter associations of debtors, Landschaften, 
in which both the individual properties and all landholders mutually backed a mortgage bond 
that the individual debtor himself had to sell in order to receive capital (Wandschneider 2013: 
11). Both conservative lending standards and trust in the monitoring of the local landholders 
enabled the holders of larger estates to go into considerable mortgage debt, whereas small 
landowners were usually discriminated against. It also meant the creation of an organised 
credit system in a time when personal, informal credits were still the most common form, and 
it established a circuit of finance for largely agricultural purposes. These institutions thrived 
where regional noblemen with large property holdings had sufficient peer-solidarity to enter 
mutual guarantees. They, therefore, hardly arose in areas where property holdings were 
fragmented among many smaller owners such as in the German Rhineland, the Low 
Countries, or many settler colonies.  
 
Landschaften tended to emerge in feudally backward areas as means for noblemen to cope 
with the credit burdens of modernisations. Their corresponding institutions in more 
democratic agricultural regions such as the Prussian Rhineland were member-based credit 
cooperatives (Schlütz 2013). The Prussian Landschaften maintained roughly 20 per cent of 
the mortgage market, dominated in rural areas, and served as an example for Scandinavian 
and Eastern European mortgage banks (Stöcker 1998). 
 
In Denmark, the development of specialised bond-issuing mortgage banks was, much like 
developments in Prussia, linked to crisis where, following the Great Fire of Copenhagen in 
1795, one in four houses were either damaged or destroyed. Steffen Andersen (2011: 185) 
14 
notes that, by the early twentieth century, Denmark had one of the largest markets for 
mortgage bonds in the world, with outstanding mortgage bonds amounting to 71 % of GDP in 
1915, but that ‘no simple explanation seems to offer itself for the ... size and growth of the … 
Danish mortgage system’ (ibid.). 
 
Across the Øresund strait in Sweden, the first bond issuing rural mortgage association 
(Landhypoteksföreningen) developed in the southernmost region of Skåne in 1836. Inspired 
by the Prussian mortgage bank model, and emerging out of the pressing need to extend credit 
to Sweden’s burgeoning rural communities, the Skånska hypoteksföreningen - established in 
Lund - provided the blueprint for similar associations which would spread throughout 
Sweden - mainly in central and southern regions - during the following two decades. Unlike 
in Prussia, however, these institutions were not top-down but formed as bottom-up initiatives 
by rural property owners.  
 
The nineteenth century liberal adaptation of the Landschaften in the more ‘advanced’ parts of 
Europe was the model of the joint-stock mortgage bank, where stock capital reserves and 
individual properties served as collateral for the mortgage bonds issued. After first attempts 
in France, Belgium and Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century, the French Crédit 
Foncier was founded and soon turned into the de facto state monopoly on the sale of 
mortgage bonds in 1852. Designed as a private stock bank, the Crédit foncier was intended to 
issue mortgages to credit seeking farmers (as an imperial gesture to regime-supporting 
peasants) to be refinanced by the sale of mortgage bonds on the Parisian capital market 
(Allinne 1984). However, in reality, it soon turned to the more profitable urban real estate 
market and financed large parts of the Haussmannisation of Paris and Provincial towns (Vaz 
2009).  
 
This form of joint stock mortgage bank became the model for other European countries, 
either with state monopolies as in France, Portugal (Companhia Geral do Crédito Predial 
Portugès, 1864), partially Italy (Istituto Italiano di Credito Fondiario, 1866), Spain (Banco 
Hipotecario, 1875), Iceland (1900, Veðdeild Landsbanka Íslands) and Greece (1927), or in 
form of a multitude of private banks such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark and 
the Netherlands. Many of these banks were still founded with the reform idea to support 
agricultural credit needs, but the growing city extensions and renovations in times of growing 
urbanisation meant that banks turned very quickly to urban real estate, even in countries such 
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as Spain or France, where urbanisation was slower and the government had complete control 
over its monopoly mortgage bank (Lacomba and Ruiz 1990). When international competition 
in agriculture began to depress agricultural land prices in the 1870s, mortgage banks turned 
even more to cities. 
 
Figure 1. Aggregate share of mortgage loans outstanding, broken down by type of lender in 
a selection of countries, c. 1900-1910 
Sources: Cf. (Blackwell and Kohl 2017) 
 
Figure 1 depicts the share of mortgage credit outstanding, broken down by type of lending 
institution - i.e. those who rely on the issuance of bonds to extend mortgage credit and those 
who rely on deposits. Most of the deposit-based countries are clearly recognisable from this 
Figure, but the countries hitherto described as bond-based have, to varying degrees, an 
institutional housing finance system based on a combination of bond-based and deposit-
based lending. Our decision to delineate a bond-based typology is based on the fact that, 
although most European bond-based mortgage banks were initially established to serve the 
needs of agrarian communities, by the late-nineteenth century, lending from these institutions 
was overwhelmingly focused on urban areas, where they became the dominant providers of 
mortgages.8 Therefore, these data, at the national level, underplay the significance of bond-
based lending at the urban level. As our analysis focuses on the urban context, we feel that 
this typological distinction is appropriate. 
 
As Figure 1 attests, mortgage banks did not develop to any major extent in north-western 
Europe and former Anglo-Saxon settler colonies. Though the common law related absence of 
a land-registry equivalent of the German Grundbuch is certainly a background condition, it 
does not explain all cases, as Belgium developed a low number of mortgage banks, despite 
legal difficulties (Schulte 1918). The Netherlands is a special case too because even though 
they developed many mortgage banks, their overall market share was relatively low 
(Eberstadt 1914). Mortgage banks in the Netherlands, then, were much more regional in 
nature and their absolute size and average loan size was significantly lower than in Germany 
(ibid.). 
 
The 1900-era world of bond-based mortgage finance, then, lies in the East of the German 
Empire and radiates both to northern, eastern and western regions, with early adopters of 
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mortgage banks generally having higher levels of mortgage bond circulation per capita. 
Figure 2 displays the 243 European mortgage banks that existed around WWI, differentiated 
by type. The historical centre for the mutual and public type are the German states, those 
attached to savings banks existed in the Alpine region, while the private-stock-bank type 
started in more liberal Western Europe. Mortgage banks, however, did not generally spread to 
the Anglo-Saxon countries and, thus, the ideal-type deposit-collecting countries share the 
absence of any bond circulation, while countries with direct finance dominance in southern 
Europe display relatively low levels. 




Sources: Illustration of (Hecht 1900) 
 
The heyday of bond-based finance was certainly before WWI when the major urbanisation 
waves created a demand shock in late-urbanising European countries. Ever since this era of 
phenomenal industrial and urban growth, however, their relative importance has declined. 
The post-WWI inflation in many countries, rent controls for buildings financed by mortgage 
banks and the breakdown of (international) capital markets more generally led to a decline of 
private and a rise of state-sponsored finance for housing construction. Figure 3 shows this 
decline, but simultaneously shows the persistence of the bond-based systems over time: once 
a country introduced such a system, it generally endured throughout the following century.  
 
Figure 3. Time-series of mortgage-bank share of all financial assets 
 




The state finance mode is the most centralised of all our housing finance modes present 
above. This mode is the least unambiguous in our fourfold typology, however, and can exist 
within both deposit-based and bond-based systems. States can pool resources via a variety of 
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channels; from centralised state savings and bank capital, to mandatory state pension funds, 
treasury funds, or even by the issuance of specialised housing bonds. Indeed, sometimes the 
centralised mortgage banks were used for this purpose; for example, when the French Crédit 
foncier was charged with lending state subsidies to mortgagees. Examples of this type are the 
Belgian Caisse Générale d’épargne et de retraite, which centralised savings banks and 
pension deposits to redirect them to small mortgages (Schulte 1918), or the French 
equivalents Caisse nationale des retraites et de la veillesse and the Caisse des dépôts et 
consignations. Another example is the nationalisation of life insurances in Italy in 1911 as 
Istituto Nazionale delle Assicurazioni, later used for state-led housing construction (Piluso 
2012). In many countries, the early social security funds served as long-term capital for 
financing government-subsidised housing construction, often directed toward homeowners. 
While some countries relied on existing networks of non-profit housing associations, others 
used municipal institutions or built up central state institutions.  
 
Two distinct phases of state-driven housing finance can be observed. The first occurred in the 
nineteenth century during the establishment phase of modern housing finance systems, 
predominantly in the later-developers whose industrial and urban growth spurts occurred in 
the context of relative low financial maturity, or what Gerschenkron termed economic 
backwardness. Norway during the nineteenth century provides a good example of the state 
finance mode during the establishment phase. Norway’s weak domestic capital base, meant 
that Kongeriget Norges Hypothekbank (Mortgage Bank of the Kingdom of Norway), 
established in 1852, played a central role in long-term lending for both urban and rural 
housing construction (Lange 1994: 791), but this story was played out across the Norwegian 
capital market. As Even Lange notes, ‘One reason for the predominance of public sector 
banking institutions was their superior ability to mobilize foreign capital for domestic 
purposes’. Lange further comments that, ‘This way of channelling foreign capital to Norway 
was open only to the public sector, as private agents had no comparable credit standing 
abroad’ (ibid. 792). Thus Norway’s economic immaturity was a barrier to private capital 
market formation. In the absence of private actors, the state played a central role in 
mobilising capital for urban housing production. 
 
Subsequently, such developments repeat in countries like Greece and Iceland (Landsbanki) 
and even later in East Asia. Greece reacted to the massive inflow of new populations from 
Asia Minor in the 1920s with the creation of a national mortgage bank, later joined by a 
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national housing bank (Leontidou 1990). In Asia, Japan created the Hypothec Bank of Japan 
at first as a debenture-issuing institution in 1896, although, contrary to its name, its primary 
lending focus was still agriculture, manufacturing and city corporations (Tamaki 2005: 98). It 
became the trendsetter for a state-led system of special banks that also led to the Housing 
Finance Corporation in 1950. Still in 1995, the public housing finance share amounted to 
42.3% (Hayakawa 2002: 25)9. 
 
State involvement in national housing finance systems, however, was not confined to the pre-
1914 period; this can be seen merely as an establishment phase. The second phase of state 
finance was realised strongest cross-nationally between the 1920s and 1970s, where we 
witness an unprecedented degree of state involvement in housing and housing finance 
systems in the majority of OECD countries, with even the most advanced countries providing 
state support to their housing finance systems. In this respect, housing can be seen as another 
example of the rise and fall of state banking institutions (Verdier 2000). The impacts of these 
varying institutional constellations of state-sponsored housing finance, are thus more 
indeterminate, and conditioned by multiple factors such as the level of organised credit 
market development and the pre-existing institutional nexus of housing finance provision. 
 
A useful metric to appreciate the development of state housing finance is the percentage of 
newly constructed units that is due to private constructions. Even though these might be 
partially state-supported in some countries, through fiscal exemptions or direct building 
subsidies, the main source of capital is principally private, when compared to direct state 
institutions or housing associations as the constructing bodies. Figure 4 reveals clearly the 
twofold realisation of the state finance type: most countries reach all-time lows of private 
construction after the wars, even in countries with limited housing welfare such as the USA 
or Portugal. From the 1950s onwards, however, private construction gradually begun to 
displace state construction throughout the OECD. 
Figure 4. Share of private construction 
 
 
Sources: National Statistical Offices 
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Exploring explanatory hypotheses 
During the course of the long nineteenth century, industrialising countries developed systems 
of urban housing finance, whose basic pillars are still recognisable today. However, despite 
undergoing similar historical processes, countries developed a variety of housing finance 
systems. While most countries moved from a direct finance mode to some degree of 
institutionalised banking finance, and while most countries shared a high degree of state 
finance in the 1920-1970 period, these similar trends hide systematic structural differences 
between countries; notably the extent to which they relied on either deposit- or bond-based 
mortgage finance. Now we explore the extent to which we can quantify and generalise the 
single-case country evidence outlined above. First, we try to account for the emergence of 
bond-based mortgage banking before WWI. We limit ourselves to correlational analyses, 
given data availability, a maximum of 15 country cases and a non-normal dependent variable. 
Second, we try to account for the path-dependence by regressing a pre-WWI mortgage-
banking variable on a time series of mortgage bank-share development, controlling for factors 
influencing financial systems. 
 
The emergence and growth of mortgage banks can be documented in most countries before 
WWI as the share of mortgage bond finance of all financial assets (adapted from: Goldsmith 
1969). We choose this measure for reasons of data availability and robust correlation with 
alternative measures, but also because it controls for the general growth of finance that 
occurred in virtually all countries. While the absolute mortgage bank volumes increased 
everywhere, their share of all financial assets displays a falling tendency (see Figure 3). This 
measure of outstanding mortgages also has the advantage of accounting for the accumulation 
of mortgages of previous years and therefore goes beyond a single year snapshot. To account 
for the pre-WWI mortgage bank share, we use the 1900 level and correlate it with our most 
important explanatory variable: GDP per capita in 1870. While the overall linear correlation 
is weak, the following scatterplot reveals that this is due its parabolic form. This inverted U-
shape for economic development and overall assets of financial institutions has been found in 
corporate finance literature (Fohlin 2000) and is replicated here for mortgage finance. The 
scatterplot allows us to distinguish the moderately backward countries with bond-based 
and/or state-finance from the two other groups during the late nineteenth century and into the 
early twentieth century: we can see that the deposit-based countries are all economically 
advanced (as per their high per capita GDP), whereas the direct finance countries are least 
developed. Between these two distinct modes, we can observe overlap between the bond-
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based and state finance countries; the areas that would be categorised as moderately and 
extremely backward in our Gerschenkron-inspired typology. This is simply because we are 
unable to disaggregate bonds issued by private or semi-private institutions from those issues 
by state bodies in such an analysis.  
Figure 5. Mortgage Bond Share of Financial Assets (1900) & per capita GDP (1870) 
 
Sources: (Goldsmith 1969, Maddison-Project 2013, Andersen 2011) 
 
Besides economic development, legal factors influence financial development, which is also 
reflected in the above clusters. Lacking a public land registry that mortgage banks relied upon 
elsewhere, Common Law countries did not develop bond-based mortgage banks before WWI 
to any major degree, while countries influenced by the French Civil Code did so, but to a 
lesser extent than countries of German or Scandinavian legal origin, using La Porta’s 
classification of legal systems (2008). Political factors, in turn, can be operationalised by the 
latent democracy index that factorises seven existing democracy measures (Földvári 2014). 
The higher this metric variable, the more developed a country’s democratic institutions. The 
previous section made clear that mortgage banks emerged first and foremost in countries with 
‘backward’ democratic development as a means to mobilise capital from above. The 
correlation between the democracy index of 1900 and the mortgage variable turns out to be 
significantly (p=0.04) negative (-0.56) for the 14 countries covered.  
 
Across all cases examined here no correlation could be observed between the administrative 
centralisation of a country (Verdier 2002b, 29) and its mode of housing finance. Interestingly, 
however, within bond-based housing finance systems it appears to play a role, with more 
centralised states such as France and Spain having only one centralised mortgage bank, and 
the more decentralised states such as Germany or Switzerland having multiple.  
 
While these associations use variables from debates in historical corporate finance, the role of 
urbanisation is more specific to the housing finance case, as we hypothesised that late-
urbanising countries were in particular need of large amounts of capital and mortgage banks 
were a means to accommodate this need. Correspondingly, a correlation of countries’ level of 
urbanisation measured by the per capita population in cities with 100.000 (alternative: 
50.000) inhabitants (Banks and Wilson 2013) with the mortgage variable yields a negative -
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0.35 (alternative: -0.41) correlation, yet with low significance levels. Using the 1870-1900 
urbanisation growth difference as a “spurt variable” produces an expected positive 
correlation, but also with low strength and significance. While these factors were important in 
the emergence mortgage banks, however, their continuity is a different matter.  
 
In order to test whether housing finance history matters, we use the 1880 mortgage bank 
share levels as a proxy for the mortgage regime developed in order to explain twentieth 
century developments of mortgage bank shares. Figure 3 (above) implies a continuity of the 
country rankings in mortgage bank shares over time, and the autocorrelation with the pooled 
data points up to the 1960s is indeed on average 0.92 for our 17 countries. We could 
circumvent the non-normality and strong skewness of this dependent variable - remember 
that many countries never came to develop these types of banks - through a logit regression 
on the binary variable ‘mortgage banks (yes/no)’. However, there are hardly cases that moved 
from 0 to 1 (only the very late developers) and no case that moved from 1 to 0, which just 
confirms the correlational findings and is not sufficient variation. 
 
The alternative we choose is a panel regression on the mortgage bank countries only, using 
their logarithmised mortgage bank share as dependent variable to normalise it (Shapiro-test p-
value of 0.09). This permits us to see additionally whether the nineteenth century mortgage 
bank-share levels also determine their twentieth century levels and not just the existence (or 
not) of mortgage banks. To do so, we control for various factors which are typically used to 
account for the development of financial systems because they could confound the historical 
influence of mortgage systems over the period of 83 years. Thus, the growth of finance in 
countries has been explained by GDP (Goldsmith 1969), by the rise of democratic institutions 
(Calomiris and Haber 2014) and by the need of states to organise their state debt. We 
therefore include GDP per capita (Maddison-Project 2013), the above democracy variable, 
and state debt (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010) as control variables. We also use the share of big-
city population (100.000 inhabitants), as this might drive mortgage needs. As our main 
explanatory variable, we use countries’ 1880 mortgage-bank-share levels as a time-invariant 
variable to explore path-dependence. The remaining unbalanced panel contains only 11 
European countries over time and, as such, this analysis can only be read as exploratory. As 
we are more interested in cross-country differences than the overall declining trends over 
time, we estimate a between model. In a first step, we provide estimates using the four typical 
22 
control variables. The second step introduces then the time-invariant variable on the 1880 
mortgage level. 
 
Table 2. Between-model on log. mortgage-bank-shares within bond-based regimes, 69 
country-years 
 
The first model reveals that, at low levels of significance, democracy, urban growth and state 
debt growth impact negatively on the mortgage bank-share, while GDP has a positive 
influence. This suggests that the factors that brought mortgage bank systems into being do 
not have to be the same that determine their subsequent course of development. The 
explained variance is at 21.6%. More importantly, the inclusion of the path-dependency 
variable in the second model makes this variable the only one that is positively significant. 
The explained variance also increases to 38.6%. This is one support for the idea that our 
historical account mattered for subsequent developments. The more countries relied on 
mortgage banks in 1880, the more they tended to rely on them during the course of the 




This section seeks to develop the theoretical and empirical insights from the previous sections 
and explore to what extent we can relate our systematic and historical typological schema to 
two dominant typological traditions within the field of political economy: the VoC-related 
distinction of market- versus bank-based corporate finance, and the more recent residential 
VoC approach.  
 
In our fourfold typology, we suggest that countries can be grouped into different housing 
finance systems depending on the principal source of urban-oriented mortgage credit. The 
country case studies above reveal that this systematic typology, presented in Table 1, has a 
temporal dimension, with direct and deposit-finance preceding the emergence of bond-based 
and state finance. This dimension also overlaps with the degree of capital centralisation of the 
systems. The previous section added an explanatory dimension to this typology: the later a 
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country’s economic (and urban) development, the more it relied on the more centralised 
bond- and state finance systems. Once established, these modes of housing finance developed 
along path-dependent trajectories. This sequence of housing finance development resonates 
with much of the Gerschenkronian stage-theory that ties economic to financial development. 
Originally applicable to the sphere of corporate finance, our analysis shows that the sequence 
of economic (and urban) development, in combination with legal and political factors, can 
also account for the development of housing finance institutions. It thus appears that there is a 
common cause behind two otherwise independent spheres within modern financial systems, 
namely housing and corporate finance. Table 3 offers a synopsis of our housing finance 
typology, anchored in the Gerschenkronian stages of industrial development and juxtaposed 
to simultaneous developments in corporate finance. 
Table 3. Industrial Development, Capital Mobilisation, and Housing Finance 
 
Sources: Adapted from Gerschenkron (1962); (Selwyn 2014: 86); and Landes (1999) 
 
Although the differentiated trajectories of corporate and housing finance share a common 
cause and are components of the same national financial system, their developments appear 
essentially different and autonomous. A comparison of the last two columns in Table 3 
suggests this. Countries with universal banking in corporate finance tended to develop 
considerable bond-based mortgage banking sectors, while so-called market-based mortgage 
countries relied more on deposits. Our mortgage-asset index shows a positive correlation with 
Fohlin’s index of universal banking of r = .32 and a negative correlation of r = -.40 with the 
stock market capitalisation per GDP in 1913 (Rajan and Zingales 2003). Note that these 
correlations are based on continuous variables and thus do not hinge on the contested 
question of which country belongs to which discrete type. As both spheres of finance are 
largely institutionally independent, we interpret the correlations as spurious: there is no 
causal connection between the two spheres of finance but they both result from a common 
cause - late development - which had institutionally differentiated effects in both spheres.  
 
Rather than spill over or complementarity between these two spheres of finance in the 
respective country groupings, then, they seem to have co-evolved along two distinctly path-
dependent trajectories. These findings turn some tenets of the VoC approach upside down 
because the sphere of housing finance seems to follow a different institutional logic from the 
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sphere of corporate finance. While LMEs might have relied on capital markets in the sphere 
of corporate finance, their principal source of housing finance came traditionally from 
deposits, which were very much off market. Conversely, CMEs, while relying on banks to 
finance companies, developed mortgage bonds sold on capital markets to build large parts of 
their urban housing stock. This latter method of capital mobilisation, then, was very much 
integrated within the dynamics of capital markets.  
 
In our schema, countries’ historically rooted housing finance systems can be characterized by 
their principal institutional source of mortgage credit, whereas existing mortgage typologies 
rely mainly on the relative size (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008). When correlating mortgage 
debt to GDP (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor 2017) with the share of bond-based mortgage 
banking between 1880 and 1963, we find a positive but weakly fitting correlation. In fact, 
some bond-based countries such as Denmark or Switzerland have had historically the highest 
levels of mortgage indebtedness in relation to GDP. But as deposit-based countries, 
particularly in more recent periods, have also accumulated much mortgage debt, it would 
seem that there are at least two functionally alternative institutional means of generating large 
volumes of private mortgage debt in modern housing finance systems. Or, to put it another 
way, there have been two alternative paths to mobilising housing capital by transforming 
shorter-term deposits into the long-term supply of mortgage capital in OECD countries 
(Schwartz 2014).  
 
Although our typologies can be seen to correspond to Schwartz & Seabrooke (2009) to some 
extent (direct finance = familial, deposits = liberal, bonds = corporatist, statist-
developmentalist = state-finance), in terms of outcomes, the implications of our typologies 
are fundamentally different and even challenge some of the causal mechanisms Schwartz & 
Seabrooke identify. We believe that the associations they observe between housing tenure, 
welfare and mortgage debt within OECD countries are largely ephemeral, and not causally 
significant over the long run of housing finance system development. There are several 
reasons for this disjuncture between our conclusions and theirs. First, their study is interested 
in neither the type nor source of housing finance within each of their country cases: they 
assess financial liberalisation only in relation to levels of mortgage securitisation and 
aggregate levels of mortgage debt, ignoring covered bonds. Second, their typology is based 
on housing tenure and relative levels of household indebtedness and how these ostensibly 
interact with the structure of welfare states. Third, the residential VoC framework is born 
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from an analysis of a very specific timeframe (the average of two years: 1992 and 2002). 
Because of the volatile nature of mortgage volumes, which in turn follow volatile house price 
movements, we believe that our institutional typology has been shown to be much more 
stable over the long run. 
 
Finally, contemporary housing finance systems have often been characterised by their degree 
of liberalisation (Fuller 2015, Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008). Fuller convincingly observes 
an association between liberal mortgage regulation and higher volumes of mortgage debt 
since about 2000, but leaves the question of where these regulatory traditions come from 
largely unanswered. One possible hypothesis could be that whatever historical housing 
finance system was first established in a country also determined (in part) its subsequent 
regulatory style. As support - and disregarding the general outlier, Denmark - we find a 
significant negative correlation (-0.54 at 1% significance) of 21 countries’ historical bond 
circulation in 1900 and their degree of liberalisation in the 2000s, using Fuller’s credit 
approach index. Apparently, then, the historical bond-based systems left a legacy of more 
conservative lending standards, which have regulatory impacts even today. 
 
Conclusion 
As revolutionary as they may seem, recent cross-national housing finance system 
developments still appear to contain palimpsests of a more distant past. Even though the 
historically bond-based and deposit-based finance systems have taken two alternative routes 
to the high levels of private mortgage indebtedness we witness today, the historical market 
share of these different institutions in countries’ mortgage portfolios, their regulatory 
frameworks, and the urban buildings they helped to finance, still resonate today. The 
heterogeneity we observe originated in the long nineteenth century and was brought about by 
the relative degrees of economic and urban ‘backwardness’, in combination with legal and 
political factors.  
 
Whilst we have demonstrated that housing finance systems exhibit path-dependent 
tendencies, we have also acknowledged that these systems are not immutable. Similarly to 
corporate finance systems, there has been a certain degree of convergence and institutional 
overlap in national housing finance systems. For instance, whereas historically bond-based 
countries gradually began to introduce specialised deposit-based institutions, such as the 
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continental type of savings and loan associations during the 1920s, the securitisation 
revolution in certain deposit-based countries (particularly in the USA) has created a particular 
kind of bond finance; although, significantly, residential mortgage back securities, unlike 
conventional bonds, are off balance sheet. Further, a development that has affected nearly all 
of the formerly specialised banks analysed in this paper, is that they have become integrated 
parts of other banking structures, with commercial and universal banks having made major 
inroads into the mortgage business since the 1970s in most OECD countries.  
 
Over time, then, the four-fold typology we propose here needs more nuance than can be 
achieved in one paper seeking to understand the emergence and subsequent diffusion of 
national housing finance systems. But also within space, the analysis at the level of nation 
states needs to be complemented by more fine-grained analyses of urban and regional 
mortgage markets. Particularly in federal states where several mortgage law jurisdictions co-
existed until the early twentieth century. While this paper has mainly focused on the causal 
side of housing finance systems, the consequences of these various modes of housing finance 
system needs more research. The classical consequence studied in corporate finance research 
is economic growth: what type of finance drives growth? The consequence of mortgage 
finance is, obviously, housing. How housing form and tenure are affected by housing finance 
are thus natural follow-up questions. The consequences for mortgage volumes, house prices 
and mortgage interest rates and financial innovation also requires further study.  
Interestingly, the development of housing finance systems in the nineteenth century still 
appears to be associated with the significant contemporary changes in housing finance: the 
degree to which countries developed (off balance sheet) securitization. Countries which did 
not develop a system of bond-based mortgage banking extensively during the nineteenth 
century, and who instead relied on deposits or direct finance, have tended to opt for 
securitisation as a strategy of mortgage origination, whereas countries that developed a bond-
based housing finance system over the course of the nineteenth century are more likely to 
remain bond-based today. Indeed, using our 1900 mortgage bank share measure and 
conducting a simple bivariate correlation between this and the pooled levels of RMBS 
outstanding since the financial crisis (2008 to 2014) in 11 country cases produces a strong 
negative correlation (r = -0.708, significant at 0.01). Thus, the more a country was bond-
based in 1900, the less likely it was to produce a housing finance system reliant on mortgage 
backed securities. As these remain firmly on banks’ balance sheets these bonds proved to be 
significantly lower risk during the Global Financial Crisis. That the origins and subsequent 
27 
developments in national housing finance systems over a century and a half ago could be 
linked to financial stability today, should intrigue and encourage scholars to take the 






1 Adapted from Boléat (1985) and Lea (2009), and generalised from a two-country comparison in Kohl (2015). 
2 Polillo recently refined the link between democracy and financial inclusion by using a financial elite argument: 
if liberal bankers (“wildcats”) prevail over conservatives, more permissive lending practices can ensue (Polillo 
2013). More within-country depth is needed, however, to include this elite dimension in the analysis of 
mortgage systems. 
3 "Estimates suggest that in 1900 traditional intermediaries were doing between 32 and 65 per cent of mortgage 
lending in Britain, Germany, and the United States" (Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal 2015).  
4 In Scandinavian countries, the early cooperative housing associations served a similar purpose prior to the 
First World War (Sørvoll 2013: 106), whereas Central European countries rather relied on municipal and non-
profit rental housing (Kuhn 2007). 
5 For example, credit unions and mutual savings banks, which followed the ideas of Schulze-Delitzsch and 
Raiffeisen. 
6 In cases such as Switzerland, mortgage banks also have a small share of mortgages based on centralised 
deposits, but legislators were usually inclined to separate these different finance mechanisms. 
7 Alternatively, the mortgage bank assets as share of all financial assets, whose 1900 level correlates at r = 0.94 
with 1898 bond circulation per capita. The latter also correlates at 0.76 with a third alternative measure: the pre-
WWI bond-based mortgages as share of all mortgages financed by banks. 
8 Whilst it is difficult to assess exactly how much urban mortgage lending was financed by mortgage banks, the 
mortgage-bank lending share backed by urban property became dominant during the early stages of the 
twentieth century (even up to 100 per cent in some town and cities). (see for country-specific sources: Blackwell 
and Kohl 2017). 
9 In other Asian economies, state involvement through developmental banks was even more staggering, 
however largely financed through the Treasuries, or centralised savings in state savings banks (Agus, Doling, 
and Lee 2002): Singapore established its Housing and Development Board in 1960, for housing and even the 
construction of complete towns, amounting to over 80% of all housing finance; In Hong Kong, the Hong Kong 
Housing Authority (1954) created a rental and owner-occupier stock amounting to 55% of all housing stock in 
1999, while only 7% of all units constructed in Taiwan between 1955-99 were with private money only; The 
Korean Housing Bank (1969), also a bond emitter, and the National Housing Fund accounted for 32,2% and 
48,1%, respectively, of all housing finance by 1996. 
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